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“The Islamic State’s ability to draw on multiple sources of funding poses a challenge to 
international efforts to contain and degrade the group’s strength”.1 
 
Introduction  
 
On September 11 2001 19 al Qaeda operatives committed the largest and deadliest terrorist 
attack on the United States of America.
2
  On the morning of September 11 2001, the terrorists 
hijacked four commercial airliners, American Airlines flight 11 and United Airlines flight 
175, which were flown into the South and North Towers of the World Trade Centre in New 
York, American Airlines flight 77, which was flown into the Pentagon building, and United 
Airlines flight 93, which crashed in Pennsylvania.
3
  A total of 2,977 people died as a result of 
this act of terrorism.
4
  The response from the international community and in particular the 
US was swift.  President George Bush soon declared, what has since become referred to as 
either the ‘War on Terrorism’ or the ‘Global War on Terrorism’ on September 20 2001.5  It is 
not the purpose of this article to critique and review in detail the ‘War on Terrorism’, but to 
concentrate on a very specific aspect, the ‘Financial War on Terrorism’, which was famously 
instigated by President George Bush on September 24 2001.
6
  Until these terrorist attacks the 
financing of terrorism was neglected by the international community and many nation states, 
including the US, who had concentrated its financial crime efforts on tackling money 
laundering.  However, the terrorist attacks in September 2001 resulted in a monumental shift 
and change strategy and attitudes towards counter-terrorist financing by the international 
community.
7
  Pieth noted that “when the hijacked airplanes struck the twin towers, most 
observers would have considered it obvious to mobilise all possible means to prevent 
terrorism … including the interception of terrorist access to financial assets”.8   It has been 
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estimated that the total costs of the terrorist attacks in September 2001 were between 
$400,000 and $500,000,
9
 and that the economic damage to the US exceeded $3tn.
10
  
Therefore, the terrorist attacks generated a great deal of academic literature and commentary 
on the financing of terrorism.
11
  This extensive literature has highlighted two very important 
findings.  Firstly, terrorists are able to gain access to finance from a plethora of sources and 
secondly, there has been a steady increase in ‘cheap’ or ‘inexpensive’ acts of terrorism.  In 
relation to the first finding, terrorists have previously relied on financial sponsorship from a 
small number of nation states, which often involve national governments providing financial 
support.
12
  At the time of writing this article, the US has identified three state sponsors of 
terrorism: Iran, Sudan and Syria.
13
  It has been argued that other states, including North 
Korea, Cuba and Libya have also provided terrorists with financial support and assisted in the 
planning of their operations.
14
  However, it is now widely accepted that there has been a 
steady decline in the availability of this particular terrorist funding stream.
15
  The demise of 
state sponsored terrorism was recognised by Hardouin who stated that “state sponsorship has 
been decreasing as terrorist groups find it harder to obtain state support, and states that are 
not respecting [counter-terrorist financing] international standards are less willing to risk 
exposure to severe international sanctions”.16  There are two factors that have contributed 
towards the decline in state sponsored terrorism.  Firstly, there are fewer nation states 
engaged in sponsoring terrorist groups.
17
 Secondly, terrorist groups have adapted to the 
reduction in state sponsored terrorism and have developed a global and sophisticated network 
of financial supporters and increased engagement with illegal activity to obtain finances.
18
  
Additionally, it has been suggested that another important factor that has contributed towards 
a decline in state sponsored terrorism was the end of the Cold War, which has resulted in 
terrorists identifying alternative funding streams.
19
  The decline in state sponsored terrorism 
was also highlighted by the National Commission which concluded that al-Qaeda relied on 
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finances raised by private benefactors and not [authors emphasis] from state sponsors.
20
  
There are an abundant number of sources of funding available to terrorists,
21
 which means 
they are able to “manipulate an expanding array of tools to shield their wealth, without regard 
to international borders”.22 For example, it has been argued by some commentators that 
terrorists are able to gain financing from individuals and corporate donations, non-profit 
organisations, government programmes and criminal activities.
23
  Other well documented 
instances of terrorists exploiting a wide range of financial instruments include misapplied 
charitable donations,
24
 non-remittance financial systems,
25
 traditional criminal activities,
26
 the 
sale of conflict diamonds 
27
 and drug trafficking.
28
 
 
The second finding has been the development of ‘cheap’ or ‘inexpensive’ acts of terrorism’.  
The threat posed by cheap terrorism was identified by United Kingdom’s HM Treasury who 
took the view that “although the sums raised and required by terrorists may be large, the 
amounts of money needed to finance individual terrorist operations may be small or 
concealed”.29  One of the most infamous examples of ‘cheap terrorism’ was the first terrorist 
attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, in which six people were killed; over 1,000 were 
injured, at an estimated cost of only $400.
30
  It is important to note that this terrorist attack 
was “less devastating … because of the group’s limited financial resources”.31  In April 1995 
Timothy McVeigh detonated a truck bomb outside the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in 
Oklahoma City.  In an interview with MSNBC, Timothy McVeigh estimated that the total 
costs of the attack, including the truck rental, fertiliser, nitro methane and other costs 
amounted to $5,000.
32
  Another example of cheap terrorism was the terrorist attacks by Al 
Shabaab on the Westgate Mall in Kenya in 2014, which according to the US Department of 
Treasury “cost less than $5,000 to execute”.33  The Department of Treasury also asserted that 
the materials used in the Boston Marathon bombings in 2013 reportedly cost as little as 
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$500.
34
  Other documented examples of ‘cheap terrorism’ could include the car bomb that 
exploded outside the Sari Club Discotheque in Denpasar, Bali which killed 202 people and 
injured over 300.  It has been estimated that this terrorist attack cost $74,000 to fund.
35
  A 
further example of ‘cheap terrorism’ could be the Madrid train bombings in March 2004, 
when ten explosive devises killed 191 people and injured over 1,800 people.  The estimated 
costs to orchestrate and conduct this act of terrorism amounted to $70,000.
36
  However, 
O’Neill took the view that “the European Commission has calculated that the Madrid 
Bombings were estimated to have cost a mere €8,000, with the funding of terrorist networks 
generally having a small monetary value”.37  Furthermore, the terrorist attacks in London on 
July 7 2005 were estimated to have cost somewhere between £100 and £200.
38
  However, the 
HM Government’s official report into the 2005 terrorist attacks concluded that the “best 
estimate is that the overall cost is less than £8,000”.39  However, all of these estimates must 
be treated with an element of caution because there is insufficient “reliable data on the cost of 
attempting terrorist attacks”.40  It is against this contextual background that the article 
critically considers the effectiveness of the ‘Financial War on Terrorism’ on the funding 
streams of the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant.
41
  The next section of the article highlights 
how the international community concentrated on tackling money laundering prior to the 
terrorist attacks in September 2001 and how this policy dramatically altered.  In particular, 
this section concentrates on the development of and definition of the ‘Financial War on 
Terrorism’.  The final part of the article seeks to determine if the ‘Financial War on 
Terrorism’ is able to tackle the funding streams of ISIL. 
 
The Origins of the Financial War on Terrorism 
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The terrorist attacks in September 2001 resulted in a metamorphosis of the legislative 
response towards the financing of terrorism.  Prior to these terrorist attacks, the United 
Nations had concentrated on tackling the proceeds of crime derived from the manufacture 
and distribution of narcotic substances.
42
  For example, the UN Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, or the Vienna Convention, provided 
that signatories must criminalise the laundering of drug proceeds, implement instruments to 
allow for the determination of jurisdiction over the offence of money laundering, permit the 
confiscation of the proceeds of the sale of illegal drugs, the introduction of mechanisms to 
facilitate extradition and measures to improve mutual legal assistance.
43
  However, the scope 
of the Vienna Convention was far too narrow because it only applied to proceeds of drug 
related criminal offences.  This weakness was rectified by the UN Convention against 
Transnational Organised Crime, or the Palermo Convention,
44
 which broadened the remit of 
the UNs anti-money laundering Conventions 
45
 to include the “proceeds of serious crime”.46  
The European Union adopted a very similar approach to that of the UN and has implemented 
three Money Laundering Directives and the fourth, must be implemented by Member States 
by June 2017.
47
 The first Money Laundering Directive was introduced in 1991 and it 
concentrated on “combating the laundering of drug proceeds though the financial sector”,48 
thus adopting a very similar stance to the Vienna Convention.  The second Money 
Laundering Directive increased both its scope and the use of suspicious transaction reports.
49
 
Additionally, it is important to note the AML efforts of the Financial Action Task Force,
50
 
who in 1990 published a set of 40 Recommendations aimed at countering the threat posed by 
money laundering.
51
  The aim of the 40 Recommendations was to “provide a complete set of 
anti-money laundering procedures which covers the relevant laws and their enforcement, the 
activities and regulation of the financial system and matters relating to international co-
operation”.52  However, it is important to emphasise that none of these measures addressed 
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the financing of terrorism and it was not until 1999 that the UN approved the International 
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Financing.
53
  The International Convention was 
introduced after a series of Presidential Executive Orders were used by President Bill Clinton 
following two terrorist attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
54
  The International 
Convention criminalised the financing of terrorism; permitted the freezing, seizing or 
forfeiture of funds used for supporting terrorist activities and financial institutions were 
required to report any terrorist related suspicious activity reports.  It is important to note that 
prior to the terrorist attacks in September 2001, “only four States had acceded to the 
Convention”.55 However, at the time of writing the International Convention has been 
implemented by 186 nation states.
56
  The origins of the UN’s CTF measures originated with 
the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1267.  Resolution 1267 provides that 
member states are required to “freeze [the] funds and other financial resources controlled by 
the Taliban”.57 Furthermore, Resolution 1267 created a sanctions regime that targeted both 
individuals and entities associated with al-Qaida, Osama bin Laden and the Taliban.
58
  
Another important CTF measure was UN Security Council Resolution 1269, which asked 
nation states to fully implement the UN’s anti-terrorist conventions.  Specifically, Resolution 
1269 stated that countries should cooperate with each other to prevent and suppress terrorist 
acts; tackle the financing of terrorism; arrest and prosecute terrorists; fully comply with 
international standards of human rights and exchange intelligence.
59
  Despite the belated 
recognition from the UN of the threat posed by the financing of terrorism, it was not until the 
terrorist attacks in September 2001 that President George Bush instigated the ‘Financial War 
on Terrorism’, which the article now moves on to consider.   
 
Following the terrorist attacks in 2001, President George Bush famously declared that “a 
major thrust of our war on terrorism began with the stroke of a pen … we have launched a 
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strike on the financial foundation of the global terror network … we will starve the terrorists 
of funding … money is the lifeblood of terrorist operations”.60  This declaration was followed 
by the publication of an action plan to tackle terrorist financing by the G7 Finance Ministers 
and Central Bank Governors in October 2001.
61
  The G-7 Finance Ministers and Central 
Bank Governors stated: 
 
“We stand united in our commitment to vigorously track down and intercept the assets 
of terrorists and to pursue the individuals and countries suspected of financing 
terrorists. We will implement UN sanctions to block terrorist assets … We welcome the 
decision by the Financial Action Task Force to expand its mandate to combat terrorist 
financing”.62 
 
The response from the UN was instantaneous, swift, severe and controversial.
63
 Terrorist 
financing was removed from political obscurity and pushed towards the summit of the global 
counter-terrorism agenda.  The first UN legislative measure that needs to be briefly 
considered following the terrorist attacks in 2001 is UN Security Council Resolution 1368,
64
 
which requests that all nation states should work together and target the ‘sponsors’ of 
terrorism.
65
 However, the central tenet of the UN’s legislative stance towards the financing of 
terrorism was UN Security Resolution Council 1373.  Resolution 1373 was introduced under 
chapter VII of the UN Charter and compelled nation states to implement mechanisms to 
counteract terrorist attacks.
66
 In relation to terrorist financing this Resolution contained four 
measures.  Firstly, nation states are expected to “prevent and suppress the financing of 
terrorist acts”.67  Secondly, nation states are expected to criminalise the financing of 
terrorism.
68
  Thirdly, countries are compelled to “freeze … funds and other financial assets or 
economic resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist”.69  Fourthly, 
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nation states are obliged to “prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their 
territories from making any funds, financial assets or economic resources or financial or other 
related services available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of persons who commit or 
attempt to commit or facilitate or participate in the commission of terrorist acts”.70  
Furthermore, Resolution 1373 established the Counter-Terrorism Committee which would 
monitor and observe the levels of compliance with the four CTF provisions.
71
  The remit of 
the Counter-Terrorism Committee was extended by UN Security Council Resolutions 1535 
72
 
and 1566.
73
  Therefore, the terrorist attacks had an instantaneous and dramatic effect, and 
fundamentally altered how the international community considered the financing of 
terrorism.  The measures introduced by the UN heavily influenced the composition of the 
‘Financial War on Terrorism’ and included the criminalisation of terrorist financing, the 
ability to freeze and confiscate/forfeiture terrorist assets.  Additionally, the EU has 
implemented a series of CTF measures following the terrorist attacks.  The most important of 
which was the extension of the third Money Laundering Directive to include the financing of 
terrorism.
74
  This extended the obligation by reporting entities to submit a suspicious 
transaction report where they suspected the transaction was used for the funding of terrorism.  
Further measures introduced by the EU included the publication of the European Council 
Common Position, which provides that the EU will “adopt financial sanctions … that will 
ensure that funds, financial assets, economic resources or other related services will not be 
made available to designated terrorists”.75  The EU also published a Council Regulation that 
imposed a series of restrictive measures that were directed against certain persons and entities 
with a view to combating terrorism.
76
  This Council Regulation also contained a ‘black list’ 
of terrorist sponsors that duplicated those designated by the UN Sanctions Committee.  
Additionally, the European Council introduced anther Common Position, the EU maintains a 
“public list of territories and terrorist organisations, which it updates regularly, against which 
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further sanctions, usually on the basis of the proscription of terrorist financing is taken”.77  
Therefore, the EU followed the sanctions regime of UN and importantly extended the use of 
suspicious transaction reports from money laundering to the financing of terrorism and its 
inclusion in the ‘Financial War on Terrorism’.  The FATF has followed an almost identical 
pattern to that of the UN and EU and extended its remit to include the financing of 
terrorism,
78
 and introduced the ‘Special Recommendations’.  The ‘Special 
Recommendations’ covered a wide range of areas including the importance of countries 
ratifying and implementing UN Security Council Resolutions, criminalising the financing of 
terrorism, permitting nation states to freeze and confiscate terrorist assets, reporting terrorist 
related suspicious transactions that relate to terrorism, the promotion of international co-
operation to tackle terrorist financing, alternative remittance systems, wire transfers, non-
profit organisations and cash couriers.  The Special Recommendations are important because 
prior to their introduction there were “no international standards on the prevention of terrorist 
financing”.79  In February 2012, the FATF published its amended set of Recommendations 
which “fully integrate counter-terrorist financing measures with anti-money laundering 
controls, introduce new measures to counter the financing of the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction”.80  The terrorist attacks in September 2001 resulted in a fundamental 
alteration of policy by the international community towards the financing of terrorism.  Prior 
to 2001, the international community had not considered the financing of terrorism an area of 
priority, even though the UN had introduced the International Convention in 1999.  It was not 
until the events in September 2001 that an overabundance of legislative measures was 
unanimously implemented.  UN Security Council Resolution 1373 is the cornerstone of the 
‘Financial War on Terrorism’ and it has been administered by the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee which provides support, guidance and expert opinion for nation states on how to 
implement the Resolution. These measures have been reciprocated by the EU and the 
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extension of the FATF Recommendations.  Nonetheless, what becomes crystal clear after 
reviewing these legislative and ‘best practice’ measures is that the ‘Financial War on 
Terrorism’ can be defined as attacking, whether via criminalisation, confiscation, forfeiture, 
freezing, sanctioning the financial assets of known or suspected terrorists.  Furthermore, the 
‘Financial War on Terrorism’ also contains the use of preventative methods that have 
previously been used for money laundering and the collection of financial intelligence from 
suspicious transaction reports.  The next section of the article seeks to identify the funding 
streams utilised by ISIL and it then moves on to critically consider the effectiveness of the 
‘Financial War on Terrorism’ on these funding avenues. 
 
The ISIL Funding Model 
ISIL has gained significant notoriety since the summer of 2014 when it gained control of 
large areas of land in the Middle East after unexpected victories over the Iraqi, Syrian and 
Kurdish forces.
81
  In June 2014, ISIL declared the establishment of a “caliphate”, or a state 
that was administered in accordance with “Islamic Law, of Sharia, by God’s deputy on Earth, 
or caliph”.82  ISIL has since emerged as the largest terrorist group in the Middle East 83 and it 
has also been described as “the wealthiest terrorist organisation”.84 Saltman and Winter stated 
that ISIL has even “developed its own sub-economy”.85 In his evidence before the US House 
Committee on Financial Services, Matthew Levitt stated that “estimates put ISIS’ daily 
income at around $3m, giving its total value of assets between $1.3bn and $2bn, making it 
the world’s best-funded terrorist group.  By this standard, ISIL draws more income than 
many small nations”.86  These figures were supported by Duhaime who noted that “by 
September 2014, ISIS had revenues of at least $2bn from internal and external sources”.87  It 
has also been suggested ISIL’s total assets exceed $2tn, with an annual income totaling 
$2.9bn.
88
  Furthermore, Humud et al stated that ISIL “approved a $2bn budget” for 2015.89  
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Therefore, an essential question that needs to be addressed is how is ISIL able to access and 
control such vast sums of capital and income?  There is a clear answer to this question; ISIL 
is able to manipulate and abuse an unprecedented array of funding opportunities that include, 
inter alia, profits from criminal activities, the control of oil and gas reserves, extorting 
agriculture, the sale of antiquities and illegal taxation.
90
  Therefore, ISIL is the most 
significant threat to the effectiveness of the ‘Financial War on Terrorism’, a mechanism that 
was originally aimed at tackling the funding streams of al Qaeda.  For instance, one of the 
most distinct and innovative financing streams used by ISIL involves “selling what they have 
captured. This includes oil sales to local consumers, the Syrian regime and black marketers as 
well as exporting crude oil to Turkey”.91  It appears that ISIL “has consolidated its grip on oil 
supplies in Iraq and presides over a sophisticated smuggling empire with illegal exports going 
to Turkey, Jordan and Iran”.92  ISIL has used the same smuggling methods and routes that 
were used by Saddam Hussein during the 1990s when the international community imposed 
sanctions that prevented the sale and purchase of oil by Iraq.
93
  Indeed, the Institute for 
Economics and Peace reported that ISIL manages dozens of oil fields and refineries in both 
Syria and Iraq that generate daily revenues between $1m and $3m.
94
  Writing in 2015, 
Duhaime suggested that ISIL earned $150m from the illegal sale of oil in September 2014.
95
  
However, it has been suggested that ISIL has been unable to maintain these revenues from 
the oil fields because it has lost control of two of the largest oil fields in Iraq, Kirkuk and 
Baiji.
96
  Furthermore, Humud et al noted that it would be extremely difficult to ISIL to sell 
oil on the open market and if they were to sell, it would be at a heavily discounted price.
97
  
Nonetheless, the Wall Street Journal reported that ISIL is still able to “produce around 47,000 
barrels of oil a day from its oil fields, which would be sold on the black market for between 
$18-$35, and provide the militants with a revenue of up to $1.65m a day”.98  The 
international community has threatened to impose sanctions on countries that purchase oil 
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from ISIL. However, the effectiveness of sanctions and the ‘Financial War on Terrorism’ on 
this funding stream must be questioned.  If ISIL are able to freely smuggle oil into several 
neighbouring countries using the well-established smuggling routes and sell the oil below 
market prices, who will the sanctions be imposed on and will they have their desired impact?  
The inability of the ‘Financial War on Terrorism’ has already resulted in nation states moving 
away from imposing financial sanctions and replacing them with targeted missile strikes on 
ISIL’s oil infrastructures. It is likely that the use of targeted missile strikes will continue on 
ISIL’s oil refineries and other facilities following the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 
2015.
99
 
 
Another funding avenue utilised by ISIL is kidnapping for ransom, which has seen several 
nation states paying this terrorist group between $20m and $45m for the release of their 
citizens.
100
 The Congressional Research Services estimated that ISIL has amassed between 
$35m and $45m in ransom fees in 2014.
101
  It has even suggested ISIL has regularly earned 
$10m per month from ransom payments from foreign states and insurance companies.
102
  
Therefore, kidnapping for ransom has become a major source of income for ISIL with “tens 
of millions of dollars paid by some European governments and wealthy relatives of the 
kidnap victims over the past two years. The low end of the estimate range is well above 
$25m”.103  It is interesting to note that the countries that have paid ransoms include Germany, 
France, Italy and Spain.
104
  Conversely, the making of such payments could violate the 
criminal law provisions in both the US 
105
 and UK.
106
  Kidnapping for ransom payments have 
been made despite the approval of UN Security Council Resolution 2133 which stated that 
ransom payments to terrorists are counter-productive.
107
  Therefore, it is likely that the impact 
of the ‘Financial War on Terrorism’ on the ability of ISIL to obtain monies from kidnappings 
for ransom will be negligible.  The position is further complicated as some of the countries 
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who have made large ransom payments to ISIL and other terrorist groups are permitted to do 
so under domestic legislation.  This is an area of considerable weakness in the CTF efforts to 
limit this funding stream to ISIL and it is likely to require careful international diplomacy to 
achieve a unified stance. 
 
The inadequacies of the ‘Financial War on Terrorism’ on the funding streams of ISIL are also 
illustrated by the monies donated from foreign investors and private benefactors from several 
Middle Eastern countries including Kuwait.  This is a view supported by the FATF who 
stated that ISIL receives funding from private donations or via non-profit organisations, thus 
adopting a similar funding strategy as al Qaeda.
108
  The US Department of the Treasury has 
described Kuwait as the “epicentre of fundraising for terrorist groups in Syria”.109  
Sympathetic supporters in other countries including Jordan, Syria and Saudi Arabia have also 
provided ISIL with financial support.
110
  David Cohen of the Department of Treasury took 
the view that ISIL “derives some funding from wealthy donors” 111 and it been suggested that 
ISIL has collected up to $40m from private donors in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait.
112
  
However, it has been suggested that the amount of funding provided by private sponsors has 
“diminished and is at most only a tiny percentage of the total income that flows into ISIL 
coffers in 2014”.113  In order for the ‘Financial War on Terrorism’ to have any desired impact 
on the monies provided to ISIL from private donors and its financial supporters it is wholly 
dependent on the political will and support of nation states.  Furthermore, the impact of and 
implementation of the ‘Financial War on Terrorism’ is singularly contingent on the CTF 
measures introduced by those nation states whose citizens have been accused of supporting 
ISIL.   
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The vast funding streams of revenue that have been exploited by ISIL also include the 
imposition of illegal taxation measures which raises approximately $360m per year.
114
 
Furthermore, one of the largest funding avenues exploited by ISIL has been the sale of 
antiquities.
115
 It has been noted that almost a third of Iraq’s archaeological sites are controlled 
by ISIL and the sale of artefacts has become ISIL’s second largest funding stream.   The Wall 
Street Journal estimated that the sale of antiquities provides ISIL with approximately $100m 
per year.
116
 Duhaime concluded that “the persons financing ISIS … are art dealers from the 
UK, Switzerland and Germany, who buy several antiquities in bulk … for €500,000 or 
€1m”.117 Levitt stated that “while it is nearly impossible to estimate the total profits of selling 
these artefacts, it is known that one lion sculpture from the region sold for more than $50 
million in New York in 2007.  Most of ISIS’s captured historical gems have not been 
publicised, but could fetch similarly hefty sums”.118   
 
ISIL, like many terrorist groups have been able to gain access to funding from conducting 
criminal activities.  The Department of Treasury stated that ISIL has gained a significant 
amount of revenue from criminal activities including robbery and extortion.
119
  They added 
that ISIL has been able to “generate a portion of its extortion-derived proceeds from Iraqi and 
Syrian oil resource”.120  Indeed, it has been suggested that ISIL receives most of its funding 
from “extortion … and the group extorted taxes from businesses … netting upwards of $8m a 
month”.121  Further evidence that supports the contention that ISIL obtains its funding from 
criminal enterprises was afforded by Levitt who stated that “unlike al Qaeda, ISIS has been 
financially self-sufficient for at least eight years by virtue of engaging in tremendously 
successful criminal activity enterprises … ISIS engages in a wide range of criminal 
activities”.122  Another criminal activity used by ISIL was illustrated in June 214 when it 
“raided Mosul’s central bank and other smaller banks … [and it] made off with as much as 
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$400m in currency and gold bullion”.123 It has been reported that since the ISIL takeover of 
Mosul in June 2014, they have stolen an estimated $425m from its Central Bank.   At the 
time of writing this article, it has been suggested that banks operating in the Nineveh 
province, which ISIL controls, have a cumulative cash balance exceeding $1bn.
124
  However, 
it has been noted that the speculative claims about the amount of money ISIL seized are 
untrue.
125
  Other illegal activities that have been used by ISIL include material support 
provided by foreign terrorist fighters 
126
 and through modern communication networks.
127
  
The unprecedented evolution of the funding streams of ISIL that has clearly limited the 
impact of the ‘Financial War on Terrorism’ has been the reported introduction of its own 
currency.
128
 Duhaime noted that “ISIL has issued its own currency in two gold coins, three 
silver coins and two bronze coins, minted with Islamic State with approved imagery”.129  The 
aim of the currency is to enable ISIL to “emancipate itself from the satanic global economic 
system”.130  The development of a currency by a terrorist group is unparalleled in the 
financing of terrorism and it is extremely unlikely that any of the component parts of the 
‘Financial War on Terrorism’ as outlined at the start of this article, will be able to limit the 
use of this currency in the area controlled by ISIL.   
 
Therefore, the evidence suggests that ISIL is an extremely well-funded terrorist group that 
has become reminiscent of al Qaeda in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
131
 However, ISIL’s 
financial position belittles that of al Qaeda and other terrorist groups and that it has now 
become “a profitable multinational criminal organisation and terrorist group”.132  Indeed, 
ISIL is not only the best equipped terrorist group, but also the best funded terrorist group.  It 
has more financial wealth than al Qaeda ever had.
133
  The Department of Treasury stated that 
“ISIL is a different terrorist financing challenge. It has amassed wealth of an unprecedented 
pace, and its revenue sources are different from those of many other terrorist 
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organisations”.134  Saltman and Winter took the view that “ISIL is light years ahead of other 
jihadist groups … this is most true with regards to the means by which the group is 
financed”.135  If these reports are accurate, and that ISIL earns approximately $1m per day, 
this terrorist organisation has the financial capability to operate for many years and it can be 
regarded as the “richest terrorist group on the planet”.136 It is extremely important to note that 
ISIL’s funding model is extremely flexible and adaptable.  For example, it has been 
suggested that ISIL have actively sought not [author’s emphasis] to repeat the mistakes made 
by al Qaeda.
137
  Humud et al stated that ISIL “compiled a list of lessons learned, based on 
what they perceived as al Qaeda’s failures in Iraq … [there] was a critique of its use of 
financial resources, describing a failure to distribute funding among local cells effectively 
and the lack of a regular funding source, particularly, a foreign state sponsor”.138  There is no 
clear answer to how much funding ISIL has or even if the figures provided above are 
accurate.  It is only when ISIL’s controlled economies have been regained that we are likely 
to see a marginal impact on the funding streams of this terrorist organisation. 
 
Conclusions  
 
In response to the threat posed by ISIL President Barak Obama stated that “I ask the world to 
join in this effort … [to] starve it of financial resources, and halt the flow of foreign recruits 
to its ranks”.139  The Department of Treasury stated that they would “intensify … efforts to 
undermine ISIL’s finances”.140  This has involved adopting many aspects of the ‘Financial 
War on Terrorism’ such as imposing economic and financial sanctions and seeking criminal 
prosecutions.  Indeed, the Department of Treasury stated that it had “Abd Al-Rahman 
Mustafa Al-Qaduli, a senior ISIL official and, Abd al-Rahman Khalaf Ubayd Juday al-Anizi, 
an ISIL financier and facilitator. Imposing targeted financial sanctions on ISIL officials and 
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financiers to cut off external funding networks is an important element of our strategy to 
undermine ISIL’s financial foundation”.141  Additionally, the UK government has added 
British foreign fighters, who have joined ISIL, to financial sanctions and travel bans.
142
  
However, it has been suggested that “there is no silver bullet to disrupt ISIS financing, let 
alone ultimately defeat the organisations.  ISIS presents a unique set of circumstances”.143  
One British foreign fighter who is named in these sanctions was reported to have written on 
one form of social media that they were “laughing out loud” in response to this 
designation.
144
  However, it is important to be conscious of the fact that ISIL, unlike other 
terrorist groups around the world, has been able to obtain a large proportion of its funding 
from within areas of land it controls in Iraq and Syria. Therefore, the impact of sanctions on 
ISIL members and financiers in both of these countries is negligible.  Furthermore, the 
position has been made even more complicated because ISIL has “largely gained a financial 
foothold in Iraq and Syria by effectively taking over the local economy”.145 There are a 
number of legislative options that have already been introduced by the international 
community to tackle the threat posed by ISIL.  For example, ISIL has been subjected to 
sanctions under UN Security Council Resolutions 1267,
146
 2161 
147
 and 2178.
148
  
Additionally, the FATF took the view that several of its Recommendations could be an 
effective mechanism to limiting the funding opportunities for ISIL.  For example, the FATF 
stated that countries should criminalise the financing of terrorism,
149
 impose “targeted 
financial sanctions regimes”.150  The FATF stated that countries should “review the adequacy 
of laws and regulations that relate to entities that can be abused for the financing of terrorism. 
Non-profit organisations are particularly vulnerable, and countries should ensure that they 
cannot be misused”.151  Importantly, the FAFT took the view that “countries should 
implement appropriate preventive measures to prevent ISIL from accessing the international 
financial system, including related to customer due diligence, correspondent banking, and 
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wire transfers”.152  The FATF also provided that countries should “ensure that individuals 
providing money or value transfer services are licensed, monitored, and sanctioned for lack 
of compliance”.153 It has been suggested that one way to tackle the funding activities of ISIL 
would be for the US to “send expert teams to assist Iraqi and Kurdish forces in developing 
the financial intelligence needed to plan military operations against key ISIS elements. 
Targeting the terrorist group’s book keepers, its oil business and its cash holdings could both 
disrupt ISIS’s financing and provide additional intelligence on its inner workings”.154  
However, the effectiveness of these measures has been questioned by several commentators.  
For example Zarate noted that “you can’t lob in Treasury paratroopers or push some magic 
button in New York and stop all their financing when you've got a group [ISIL] like this.
155
  
The effectiveness of the ‘Financial War on Terrorism’ on ISIL will be limited because the 
terrorists have “established a war economy … [which] has spawned a for-profit militant 
model that breathes life into insurgencies around the world”.156  Therefore, ISIL has “the 
resources (as well as the territory) to establish itself as the hub of a global terrorist movement 
in the heart of the Middle East. There are no Treasury paratroopers to send in to seize the 
cash, or bank regulations to issue to stop ISIS from spending it”.157  
 
The aim of this article has been to highlight the likely impact of the ‘Financial War on 
Terrorism’ on ISIL.  This article has presented evidence that ISIL has been able to obtain 
funding from a very wide range of sources which has bedevilled law enforcement and 
financial intelligence agencies.  However, will the proposed sanctions have any impact on the 
finances of ISIL because it is a non-state actor?  This article has attempted to outline that 
ISIL has access to more affluent funding streams and in many ways; ISIL can be classified as 
a self-sufficient non-state terrorist organisation that has thrived on the political uncertainty 
and insecurity in Iraq and Syria.  ISIL has developed into a sophisticated modern terrorist 
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organisation.
158
  Therefore, to what extent will the ‘Financial War on Terrorism’ limit the 
funding activities of ISIL?  If we take each part of the ‘Financial War on Terrorism’ in turn, it 
can clearly be illustrated that it will have little or no effect on ISIL.  For example, how would 
it be possible for national states to prosecute the financiers of ISIL?  Only one person has 
been convicted of attempting to provide funding for ISIL in the UK 
159
 and one other in the 
US.
160
 The UN has imposed sanctions and travel restrictions on a number of named 
individuals linked to ISIL.
161
  However, the impact of these sanctions must be questioned due 
to the vast array of sources of finance that this terrorist group has accesses to.  For example, 
how will sanctions limit the ability of a private financier to provide money to ISIL? Similarly, 
what benefit will suspicious transaction reports present to law enforcement agencies against 
what are essentially self-financing terrorist groups?  In order to tackle the funding avenues of 
ISIL, it is essential that the international community and all nation states fully implement the 
‘Financial War on Terrorism’ and attempt to ascertain an improved understanding of how this 
terrorist entity operates.  All financial institutions should redouble their efforts to ensure that 
they do not act as conduits in the movement of finances associated with ISIL.  This is heavily 
dependent on how nation states draft, implement and enforce their domestic CTF laws, an 
area that needs to be consistently monitored by the international community and the FATF.  It 
has been suggested that the international community should continue to attack ISIL’s 
financial infrastructure by the continuation of tactical air strikes on selected oil refineries.  
Local nation states must also increase their efforts to limit the smuggling of oil through the 
well-established smuggling routes used by ISIL.  ISIL is the largest threat to the ‘Financial 
War on Terrorism’ its financial infrastructure is significantly more advanced than any other 
known terrorist organisation.  Therefore, the ‘Financial War on Terrorism’ is not fit for 
purpose and is unable to limit the funding avenues of ISIL.  It needs to be drastically 
reconsidered.  
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